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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Information security is a challenging problem, and the extension of this challenge into
computer security is as old as the computer itself. From physical access controls to file system
permissions to network based security, mechanisms to secure digital data have evolved along
with the progression of computer technology. The implication is that data which is worth
processing, is worth stealing, manipulating, or destroying.
One of the mechanisms developed in response to the growth of information flow is the use
of intrusion detection systems (IDS). Intrusion detection is the analysis of system activity or
data to detect malicious behavior. A typical IDS will send an alert or log an event when
anomalous activity is detected, providing a mechanism for an administrator to respond to the
alert. These systems are deployed in various forms and inside environments, broadly including
network based intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) and host-based intrusion detection systems
(HIDSs).
NIDSs look at network traffic data and other centralized information sources to determine
if an interaction between systems indicates that an attack is occurring. Snort is an example of a
network intrusion detection system which has gained wide popularity in the past decade. Snort
monitors network traffic in real time, analyzing and comparing packet data against a set of
pre-defined detection rules. Packets which match enabled detection rules trigger a pre-defined
action, typically an e-mail or log alert. NIDSs have a broad range of detection capabilities,
including denial of service, SQL injection, port scanning, and other network based malicious
activities.
Conversely, HIDSs focus on a host, monitoring file system, memory, user, and other host-
based activities for indicators that the host is under attack or compromised. Open Source
2Security (OSSEC) is a popular host based intrusion detection system. OSSEC can be installed
on a variety of platforms and performs system log analysis, file system monitoring, and system
configuration auditing. These data sources are compared against pre-defined rules and policies
to detect malicious behavior and security policy violations.
In this context, we consider intrusion response as an action taken to prevent, contain, or
stop an on-going attack. For both NIDSs and HIDSs, when an alert is received a system
administrator must determine and implement an appropriate response. A typical example of
this process is the generation of a Snort alert indicating a port scan from a certain IP address.
Upon reviewing this alert, the system administrator may choose to take action, such as blocking
that IP address via the network firewall. The delay from the time the activity is detected to
the time the response is deployed can be significant.
Automated intrusion response is a mechanism to select and deploy a response from an
automated source, i.e. without human intervention. The primary advantage of automated
response is a reduction in the delay of response from the time of detection. Research along
these lines includes investigation into real-time and preemptive response. A second advantage
is the potential for more consistent and accurate responses across systems and organizations.
A system administrator responding to an on-going attack may not always consider all the costs
of taking an action, or may fail to consider an available response which would be less costly in
the interest of meeting the threat.
In spite of these advantages, adoption of automated response has seen slow due to discom-
fort by both system administrators and system owners. Reasons for this include the complexity
of implementing automated response models, perceived loss of control over systems, and the
imprecision of available response selection methods. An informal survey of nine system admin-
istrators yielded a number of responders who indicated discomfort with employing automated
response. However, as one responder to the survey noted, the proposed approach takes a
balanced view of the situation, while their tendency is to over-react to address the incident.
This indicates a need for standardized metrics and increased automation, even for experienced
professionals.
3The motivation for this work is based on the increasing need for real-time response, inade-
quacy of statically defined cyber protection, varying intuition displayed by system administra-
tors in response selection, and the need for common metrics to advance the field of intrusion
response research.
1.1 Intuitions for response selection
The traditional approach to intrusion response selection is based on an intuitive assessment
of factors such as likelihood and severity of intrusion, extent of the potential intrusion damage,
effectiveness of suitable response actions, expected duration of the response, etc. As this
process is often conducted by the system administrator, it incorporates expert knowledge, and
thus is generally accurate. However, being dependent on human expertise, this process relies on
imprecise judgments creating inconsistency in intrusion handling among systems. In addition,
response selection often introduces a significant delay in reacting to the failure, and thus is not
appropriate in critical environments and unsuitable for automated response systems.
Intuitively, all these factors define the evaluation of intrusion response. However, they
are rarely applied in evaluation of intrusion response component in the published literature
mainly due to the lack of common interpretation and the absence of concrete metrics with
clear conceptual meaning for measuring these factors. For example, while most of the existing
models supporting automatic response selection introduce response cost as one of the factors in
the selection of the suitable response strategy, they generally do not agree on what constitutes
the response cost and how it can be measured. Some suggest that response cost includes
the labor cost of personnel involved in response deployment and criticality of the attack [10],
others see response cost as a measure of response effectiveness to a detected attack and its
disruptiveness to legitimate users [6].
1.2 Increasing need for real time response
The proliferation of complex and fast-spreading intrusions against computer systems brought
new requirements to intrusion detection and response, demanding not only advances in intru-
4sion detection mechanisms but also the development of increasingly sophisticated and auto-
mated intrusion response systems.
The growing use of automation by attackers to spread attacks and damage systems has
put an emphasis on the delay between the detection and mitigation of an intrusion. Small
increments of time on a system can mean significant additional damage done by the attacker.
For instance, the CodeRed worm was known for its rapid rate of infection [31]. One researcher,
presenting a biological model for Internet worm propagation, concluded: “Because high-speed
worms are no longer a theoretical threat, we need to automate worm defenses; there is no
conceivable way for system administrators to respond to threats of this speed.” [12]
1.3 Inadequacy of cyber protections
The majority of existing automatic intrusion response systems rely on the mapping of
attacks to pre-defined responses [20, 21]. These approaches allow the system administrator
to deal with intrusions faster, more efficiently, and effectively. However, they lack flexibility
mainly because few of these systems take into account intrusion cost factors. A similar trend
can be seen in the history of firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
Adaptive IDS trends. The early widespread adoption of intrusion detection was in the
form of rule-based systems which triggered alerts when exact matches were identified. While
these systems were easy to understand, control, and extend, attackers began to exploit the
rigidness of a rule-based detection framework.
For example, a Snort rule is listed in figure 1.1 where the detection parameters consist of
the following elements:
Source Network / Port: $EXTERNAL NET any
Destination Network / Port: $HOME NET 910
Flow: flow:to server,established
Packet content: "|10 23|Tg"; depth:4; isdataat:726,relative; content:!"|10 23|Tg";
within:712; distance:14
5alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 910 (msg:"EXPLOIT DATAC RealWin SCADA
System FC_INFOTAG/SET_CONTROL buffer overflow attempt"; flow:to_server,established;
content:"|10 23|Tg"; depth:4; isdataat:726,relative; content:!"|10 23|Tg";
within:712; distance:14; metadata:policy balanced-ips drop, policy security-ips
drop; reference:bugtraq,31418; reference:cve,2008-4322; classtype:attempted-user;
sid:14769; rev:1;)
Figure 1.1 An example of a Snort rule.
This rule will check network traffic from any external host and port to any internal host
on port 910 to see if the byte sequence ‘‘|10 23|’’ followed by characters Tg is seen. This
sequence must occur within the first 4 bytes of the payload, and there must be at least 726
bytes of data following the payload. In addition, something not equal to the byte sequence
‘‘|10 23|Tg’’ appears no further than 712 bytes of the initial byte sequence, and there should
be no more than 14 bytes after the last match.
An attacker, to evade detection, needs to vary the parameters of the attack outside of those
specified in the rule. For instance, changing the location of the sequence ‘‘|10 23|’’ in the
packet to after byte 4, or filling the payload with more than 726 bytes before listing something
that is not ‘‘|10 23|’’. While in this case a new rule can be added to cover the change when
it is detected, this approach requires constant updates to detect new attacks. Alternatively,
the rule can be broadened and generalized, making the IDS less efficient, and increasing the
number of false positives.
In response, the intrusion detection research community began to investigate anomaly based
intrusion detection. These systems attempt to dynamically adapt to the data source they are
monitoring. Instead of applying a fixed set of rules, anomaly based IDS learns characteristics
of normal behavior and generates alerts when abnormal behavior is exhibited. For instance,
if a network host suddenly begins exchanging data with a host that has never been contacted
before at odd times of the day, an alert may be sent to system administrators to investigate
the event. Anomaly based IDS is still a very active area of research.
6Dynamic firewall development. Firewalls control network traffic flow by inspecting
packet headers. They determine an action to take based on one or more header fields (most
commonly some combination of source IP address, destination IP address, source port and
destination port). In the context of the five layers of the Internet, firewalls traditionally
operate at the TCP/IP layer, using information in the TCP/IP headers to make decisions
about whether to permit packets through, drop packets, send reject messages, or perform
other actions. Stateful firewalls were developed to address the need to track connection state
data to determine how to handle a packet. For instance, packets from the Internet to a client
which would normally be dropped are permitted if they are part of an established TCP session.
While these types of firewall rules are sufficient to prevent traffic which meets a set of
statically defined parameters, the firewall must allow all traffic to those services which need to
be accessed from a remote location.
Thus, since a firewall traditionally only examines packet header data when determining
the policy to apply to a specific packet, data driven attacks against a remote public service
cannot generally be differentiated from legitimate user traffic (i.e. SQL-injection, repeated
authentication attempts). In some cases statically defined application-layer responses or event
analysis can mitigate the problem, for instance monitoring the logs and blocking connections
when more than X failed logins occur from a given source. Again, an attacker can bypass such
mechanisms by varying the parameters of the attack. A system which blocks an IP address if
five failed logons are seen within a 30 second interval, for instance, can be attacked at a rate
of four logons every 30 seconds without being detected or blocked.
To address these limitations, technologies have been developed to allow users to self-open
firewall holes by logging in to a web interface, incorporate additional decision factors such
as time of day, or use application-data layer filtering which begins to overlap with intrusion
detection and response at the system level.
As the limitations of statically defined security controls become apparent, development
shifts to incorporate dynamic forms of both network port blocking (protocol specific state
tracking) and intrusion detection (anomaly based IDS). This is mirrored in the recent directions
7taken in the field of intrusion response research.
Development of cost-sensitive intrusion response. Similar to the examples above,
the limitations of statically defined response approaches prompted a trend toward cost-sensitive
modeling of response selection [10, 2, 6, 30, 22, 29]. The primary aim of applying such models
is to balance intrusion damage and response cost to ensure an adequate response without
sacrificing the normal functionality of the system under attack. However, defining accurate
measurements of these cost factors and ensuring their consistent evaluation in a broad range of
computing environments are common challenges in using a cost-sensitive modeling approach.
1.4 Performance metrics
A recent draft document published by NIST [26] called out the need for progress defining
useful performance metrics for cyber security. Established fields of study in classical science
relied on relative comparative assessments early on and developed quantitative systems of
measurement as they matured. Longer and shorter became meters, warmer and colder became
degrees.
The need for such metrics is not recent, and significant efforts have been made toward
quantifying aspects of intrusion damage and response cost. However, the body of existing work
in this area does not address the timing sensitivity of automated intrusion response, ensure
that an approach can be reasonably implemented by a system administrator, or attempt to
apply cost-sensitive intrusion response to a broad range of environments.
One of the principle applications of good metrics for intrusion damage and response cost is
the ability to automatically choose the least costly response in time to minimize the damage
caused by an attack. While much of the work that has been pursued to define these metrics
focuses strongly on accurate quantification, this also leads to models in which the actual
computation of the response cost is time consuming to perform.
In addition to the complexity of the computation, another common problem among current
approaches to intrusion detection and response cost assessment is the amount of data-gathering
8required to use the model. Several promising approaches require building intricate dependency
graphs or detailed system models which require prohibitive amounts of time and expertise in
various aspects of the systems.
In a few cases (i.e. ADEPTS), the model can be implemented and demonstrated to work
in specific domains, but an adaptive, general-case extension of the work is not immediately
obvious.
1.5 Proposed Solution
Automated response systems are divided into three basic categories:
Static Responses are fixed to specific intrusions and are deployed regardless of the environment
or past history of the response.
Dynamic Responses are deployed based on parameters which change over time, for instance,
the past success of the response or the predicted goals of the attacker.
Cost Sensitive Responses are evaluated in the context of the system environment, organiza-
tional goals, detected attacks to estimate the negative and positive impact. The response
is selected with the lowest overall cost.
This thesis presents a host-based framework for cost-sensitive intrusion response selection.
A set of measurements to characterize the potential costs associated with the intrusion han-
dling process is introduced, along with a method for evaluating each intrusion response with
respect to the risk of potential intrusion damage, effectiveness of response action and response
cost for a system. The overall goal is to address current roadblocks to automated response
implementation, and define a metric-based framework which can be directly and universally
applied to arbitrary systems with a minimal administrative burden.
The framework is composed of a set of formulas to compute the values and costs associated
with the responses and intrusions, coupled with a methodology for enumerating the services
provided by a system, assigning value to those services, enumerating the responses and in-
trusions under consideration, and combining these into an overall data store to support the
9computations. The primary tradeoff made in this approach is the precision of quantification
for implementability and computational efficiency.
This tradeoff is based on the observation that often a system administrator is not the
primary decision maker in an organization, and may not be qualified to precisely assess the
value of a system or services. However, system administrators are typically very familiar
with the primary services they support, and have a better intuition about service dependency
and the effect that specific actions may have on organizational resources. This familiarity is
leveraged by abstracting the services provided, and directing the implementers of the IRS to
focus on the broad impact of intrusions and responses to the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of these services.
A degree of abstraction is employed when defining a system, and the resources available
on that system. This ensures that the framework is applicable across a wide variety of envi-
ronments. Even systems in one organization may have dramatically different security policies.
For instance, a public web server for informational purposes may only value availability and
integrity, but not confidentiality, whereas a database system with social security numbers
stored in it may have the emphasis on confidentiality and integrity, but can tolerate reasonable
losses in availability. By keeping these definitions abstract, the framework can be adapted to
applications, hosts, or networks of hosts.
Together with this abstraction, the use of system value as a common basis for computing
response cost allows comparisons to be made between these costs even on significantly different
systems. The pervasive assumption is that the value of a system is equal to the sum of the
values of the services provided by the system. This assumption is trivially valid by ensuring
that all resources which comprise the value of the system are included.
In addition to costs associated with the direct effects of intrusions and responses, adminis-
trative costs are accounted for which are easily overlooked when automating response selection.
For example, operational costs for both intrusions (e.g. the reporting cost incurred by a suc-
cessful intrusion) and responses (e.g. the cost of a person needing to undo the response action,
or the resources consumed to deploy the response) are incorporated into this model.
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The result is a framework specifically developed to make automated response accessible to
system administrators regardless of security background. The only assumption is a familiarity
with the systems they administer, and access to a consistent valuation method for each system.
While a degree of input data is required, the thorough system analysis and detailed enumeration
of non-essential resources required in other frameworks is avoided while maintaining sufficient
quantification precision to ensure that the response with the highest expected value is selected
consistently.
1.6 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. Separate the security policy from the cost model. The proposed evaluation met-
rics are defined in terms of system resources and overall system value, which brings a
common ground to the selection process. By abstracting and separating the security
policy and relative values from the overall cost model, this framework can be directly ap-
plied to different environment settings. This approach provides a generalized assessment
mechanism that allows the analysis of response measures for any attack in the context
of the security policies of the given system.
2. Definitions of intrusion and response cost measures. The presented cost measures
allow a full assessment of attack handling processes, considering not only direct damage
caused by the intrusion but also indirect costs that often remain hidden during cost
computation.
3. Development of a system aware adaptable model. The proposed model incorpo-
rates adaptive components based on observed behaviors of deployed responses. Those
which are unsuccessful in the past are less likely to be selected in the future, while those
which are successful are more likely to be selected.
4. An implementable framework. This work provides a step-by-step assessment process
that allows system administrators with broad range of skill level to employ the approach
in their daily practice. This is demonstrated by:
11
(a) The implementation of a full simulation as a Java Applet.
(b) A host-based Linux response system implemented and demonstrated in C.
1.7 Roadmap
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present a review of
related work in this research area. Then we present our framework and detail the selection
process in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes of the implementations using this framework, and
presents performance results which demonstrate the correctness, intuitivity, and usefulness of
this approach. Finally, we conclude with a discussion and opportunities for future development
in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
A number of techniques aimed at enhancing intrusion response automation have been
proposed and deployed, and a comprehensive review of this research work is given in taxonomies
by Natalia Stakhanova [23], and Bingrui Foo [5].
There are several categories into which intrusion response methods can be divided, but two
of the more useful classes are:
Degree of Automation Notification only, automatic selection and manual deployment, or
fully automated deployment.
Activity of Triggered Response Passive, including notification e-mails and alerts, or Ac-
tive, including blocking network traffic, shutting down services, and other changes to
system behavior.
Automated response can then be further subdivided along dimensions of:
Ability to adjust Static responses do not change over time, while adaptive responses adjust
behavior based on observable changes in system state.
Time of response Proactive responses attempt to prevent the intrusion from succeeding,
requiring short delays from time of detection. Delayed responses typically include actions
which limit or mitigate intrusion damage, and are less sensitive to response delay.
Cooperation ability Autonomous response selection occurs independently of other systems,
agents, or observed events not pertaining to the intrusion. Cooperative response selection
is negotiated between two or more response selection agents.
Response selection method Static mapping is a method of response selection where the
response action for a given alert is fixed, regardless of other factors. Dynamic mapping
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provides flexibility by allowing the response selection engine to choose different responses
depending on the system state. Cost sensitive response selection is a recent trend which
attempts to minimize the cost of the response while still adequately addressing the in-
trusion.
The general body of research related to Intrusion Response will be presented here with
a focus on automated dynamic responses. First the significant works related to automated
response in general are presented, followed by a more detailed treatment of cost-sensitive
automated response. Finally, a summary of contributions specifically to the area of response
selection cost metrics are presented.
2.1 Automated Dynamic Response
Automated intrusion response has been an active area of both research and development
efforts for several decades. A representative set of the major efforts toward automated re-
sponse are presented here, excluding the body of work for cost-sensitive response which will
be presented in section 2.2.
Cooperating Security Managers (CSM) [28] investigated the use of cooperating detection
and response systems in a distributed and scalable architecture. They proposed an architecture
by which distributed intrusion detection and response agents could operate on a host-basis,
and share information with each other. One novelty to this work is the fact that no central
coordinating authority is required. Agents are installed and run on individual host, and consist
of multiple modules including a user tracking module, a coordination module, and an intrusion
handling module.
The intrusion handling module is the component which is responsible for deploying re-
sponses. A response hierarchy is constructed as an ordering over the severity of the detected
intrusion. The more severe the intrusion is deemed to be by the system, the more drastic
the deployed response. While effectively a fixed mapping of responses to intrusion severities,
this dynamic response system could be considered as an early form of cost-sensitive response
selection in light of the consideration of user interference when determining the responses.
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Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD, [13])
was developed with the goal of providing highly accurate detection, and an easily extendable
architecture. The implementation consists of three major components: the Profiler, the Sig-
nature, and the Resolver. These components represent anomaly based detection, signature
based detection, and automated response capabilities respectively. The Resolver component
determines whether to respond to an attack based on the severity of the intrusion and the
confidence that the alert is a true positive.
Another intrusion response research project, the Adaptive Agent-based Intrusion Response
Systems (AAIRS) [15], seeks to address intrusion response in terms of formulating a high-level
response plan, and then automatically deriving a set of actions from that plan. This work is
from the same group that developed CSM, and the response selection is also based on intrusion
severity with the additional component of past success rate.
The Alphatec Light Autonomic Defense System (αLADS) [1] is an automated response
system which uses partially observable Markov decision processors to implement a stochastic
feedback control system. While some of the details of this system are hidden due to the
proprietary nature of the project, it is focused on survivable systems, allowing significant
resource losses before a system is considered non-functional.
The test prototype presented in [1] was equipped with four possible responses: Observe,
Notify, Kill, and Halt. These four responses were chosen partly to limit system complexity
for the sake of analysis, and other responses can be added. Though the stochastic nature
of the controller complicates analysis, it is significant that this system was able to halt not
only anomalous behavior which it had been trained to detected, but also novel anomalies (of
a similar nature). The αLADS system also proves to be very tolerant of false positives, not
responding to anomalies caused through normal operation of the system.
While the αLADS system impressively accommodates false positives, and employs re-
sponses which kill processes to stop intrusions, selecting response alternatives based on a
real-time cost assessment is not a part of this work. Essentially a dynamic selection of re-
sponse is performed based on the detected anomalous behavior.
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The Generic Authorization and Access Control API (GAA-API) [18, 19] is a modular
framework for adapting existing applications to use a finely grained authorization and access
control mechanism. This framework uses a simple policy language (Extended Access Control
Lists, EACL) to define conditions under which a user is permitted to authenticate to an
application. A three-tier authorization model is used for a request:
1. Pre-conditions are checked prior to allowing access to the object.
2. Mid-conditions are periodically (on an application-specified basis) tested during access
to detect suspicious activity.
3. Post-conditions are activated upon successful completion of the authenticated action.
GAA-API has been successfully integrated into a variety of applications, including Secure
Shell (SSH), the Free-S/WAN IPSec implementation for Linux, and the Apache web server.
A significant contribution of this work is the inclusion of adaptive policies for authorization
and access control. As opposed to standard authentication systems which have a static policy
defined in advance, GAA-API determines the policy dynamically, based on system state during
the processing of the authorization request and subsequent actions. While other dynamic policy
systems of this type exist, they typically either require policy switching (using different disjoint
sets of policy requirements depending on some trigger, such a time of day) or changing the
algorithms used to compute the policy. In GAA-API, by contrast, monitors system state and
uses the current state to trigger policy changes.
Snort inline [11, 14] is a plugin for the Snort IDS which allows actions using iptables (the
primary Linux firewall) and bpf (the primary BSD firewall). Whereas a typical Snort rule will
generate an alert in response to a signature trigger, Snort inline will allow an administrator to
define actions such as dropping the packet, dropping and logging, or rejecting the connection
(either through a TCP reset, or an ICMP-HOST-UNREACHABLE packet).
This implementation is popular due to the wide deployment of Snort as an IDS, however
it has the same problems that Snort has, namely a very significant degree of tuning required
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to avoid prohibitive numbers of false positives, and the reactivity implied by a signature-based
detection system.
Recent open-source work on integrating Snort with iptables has also developed in a more
dynamic sense. Two tools developed as part of this effort are psad [17] and fwsnort [16].
Psad is based upon the Bastille-NIDS project, and adapts Snort rules to match against log
messages produced from the iptables firewall on Linux. Because it utilizes iptables logs, no
additional packet monitoring libraries are required, and high-overhead deep packet inspection
is not needed. Actions can then be taken in iptables to block traffic, reset the session. Psad
effectively implements a large subset of the Snort inline functionality with little overhead.
Fwsnort is a related tool which parses Snort signature files, and implements corresponding
iptables rules which can either log the packet (i.e. simulate Snort behavior), or drop, reject,
or take some other response measure (i.e. simulate Snort inline behavior).
Together these two tools allow a system to leverage most of the Snort framework’s detection
and response capabilities using only iptables and the netfilter string match library. Similarly
to Snort inline, however, these tools suffer from the static signature basis and the assumption
of pre-existing rules to detect malicious behavior.
In the past decade a pantheon of automated intrusion response tools have been developed
both as research projects and as commercial ventures. Many popular antivirus, host-based
intrusion detection, network-based intrusion detection, log analysis, and security information
management products include some form of active response capability. However, very few of
these include a cost-sensitive dynamic response capability as presented in this thesis.
2.2 Cost Sensitive Response
Compared to automated response in general, the area of response cost assessment has
received considerably less attention. A number of significant contributions to this area do
stand out, however, particularly in the past decade.
Work by Wenke Lee et. al. [10] directly addresses the cost of deploying responses. This work
introduces a cost-benefit measure which incorporates multiple dimensions of cost in the face of
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an intrusion: response cost, damage cost, and operational cost. The inclusion of operational
cost in particular is a significant one in that often indirect costs associated with an intrusion
are overlooked in favor of the direct damage costs. However, indirect considerations such as
loss of reputation, reporting requirements, and mandatory customer notifications are often
drivers for preventing intrusions which otherwise cause little or no direct damage.
Their work employs an attack taxonomy which groups attacks by several categories in-
cluding general technical method, whether the attack execution is local or remote, a single
event or multiple events, or whether attempts are made to conceal attack activity. Points are
assigned based on the criticality of resources and the degree of damage (lethality) caused by
an attack. The damage cost of an attack is then defined to be criticality × baseD, where
baseD is the lethality. A progress metric indicating how close the attack is to being successful
is also used to scale the cost. We extend this idea to apply these cost assessment features to
both intrusions and responses, combined with a framework to guide system administrators in
performing consistent evaluations of the cost factors.
Another approach, Adaptive Intrusion Response using Attack Graphs (ADEPTS), pro-
posed by Foo et al. [6], employs attack graphs to identify the actions required to achieve
possible attack targets in a distributed system, and consequently, to show the objectives of
suitable responses. Attacker goals are expressed as end states in the attack graph with interme-
diate steps leading to the fulfillment of those goals. Responses are selected to frustrate attack
goals based on effectiveness to that particular attack in the past, disruptiveness to legitimate
users and the confidence level which indicates the probability that the attack is actually taking
place.
Models proposed by Toth and Kruegel [24], Balepin et al. [2] and Jahnke [9] not only
consider costs and benefits of the responses, but also introduce a link between the cost of
responses and the system resources in the network.
The approach proposed by Toth and Kruegel is a network-based response mechanism that
employs system resources as the building block of their cost model. Including system users,
network topology, and security control information, their work constructs a network depen-
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dency tree which is used to evaluate the impact that response and intrusion events will have
on the overall system.
The proposed cost function (impact evaluation function) incorporates the direct effect of
an event on nodes in the resource tree as well as indirect effects propagated through the
dependency relationships between nodes. To measure the degree of damage, a capability index
metric is introduced. For nodes which have no dependencies, this index is a binary value
indicating functionality (1.0), or non-functionality (0.0). In the case where dependencies exist,
a recursive algorithm is employed to compute the capability after an event’s effects are taken
into account. This algorithm considers the and/or relationships in the dependency graph, and
yields an index in the range [0, 1].
When selecting a response, the effects of each response are applied to the model, and
the resulting capability difference is used. The response which yields the greatest increase in
capability is the one which is chosen. In spite of requiring complex evaluations of the graph
structure, the performance results are very fast using optimized data structures for locally
optimal responses. As noted in their paper, finding a globally optimized response is much more
difficult and time consuming. The primary weaknesses of this approach are the complexity
involved in establishing the dependency graph, and the course granularity of the resource
model (i.e., only availability is taken into account, ignoring potential effects on integrity and
confidentiality).
An approach to host-based intrusion detection and response has been proposed by Balepin
et al. [2]. The local resource hierarchy is modeled as a directed graph where the nodes represent
specific system resources and the edges are the dependencies between them. Each node is
associated with a list of responses that can be applied to restore working state of resource in
case of an attack. A particular response for a node is selected based on (a) the cost of the
response, the sum of the resources that will be affected by the response action, (b) the benefit
of the response, the sum of the nodes, previously affected by intrusion that will be restored
to working state, and (c) the cost of the resource, the quantification of the importance of the
resource. This work constructs a resource-based gain matrix to determine the relative value
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of a response. The gain matrix incorporates information about the current system state, the
resources affected by an attack, and the resources protected by a response. These are then
combined using a probabilistic approach to determine the response which is most likely to yield
a high payoff.
While accounting for many of the important factors, and using probability to represent
the uncertainty in any intrusion scenario, the complexity of enumerating the possible system
states and assigning probabilities to them make the implementation of this method challenging.
However, one insight which is incorporated in this thesis is the use of resource ordering in order
to help administrators consistently value resources. That idea is extended in this thesis to also
aid in assessing response and intrusion impacts on resources.
A similar approach proposed by Jahnke [9] also attempts to quantify response measures
based on modeling system resources as a dependency graph, applying this methodology to
networks of systems. Although this method requires careful graph construction and validation,
it allows automatic assessment of the response success computed through the change of the
availability of resource nodes in the graph and required effort or cost defined as the amount of
instances to be modified for deploying the selected response.
One common problem with these models is the lack of consistency. Each model approaches
response cost evaluation and selection from a different perspective. Foo et al. [6] measures
the response effectiveness against a detected attack based on the past experience. Lee et
al. [10] relates the response cost to the required labor efforts. The works by [24], [2] and [9]
consider response cost in association with the system resources, but offering varying evaluation
methods. [2] measures the response cost as the sum of manually assigned costs of affected
resources. [24] calculates response cost as a function of system capability reduction, while [9]
essentially extends the idea in [24] by adding a fine-grained quantification of system resource
unavailability.
In spite of inconsistencies, however, the emerging theme in these projects effectively estab-
lishes the idea of employing system resources in evaluation of intrusion response, and based
on this promising trend we build our approach to response selection with the resources of the
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system. In this context, our model can be viewed as a generalization of the existing approaches.
2.3 Response Cost Metrics
In the development of cost-sensitive intrusion response systems, some method of measuring
or assessing the cost of a response (or the closely related metric of value) must be developed.
A summary of recent efforts to define a cost metric is given in this section.
Early work in automated response introduced simple measures by which the desirability
of different levels of response could be expressed. CSM [28] considered the severity of the
detected intrusion, based on the intuition that more severe intrusions warranted sharper re-
sponses. Emerald [13] added the use of intrusion confidence, using anomaly and signature based
detectors to determine the likelihood of an attack issuing an alert. The AAIRS project [15],
also from the Texas A&M group, contributed the idea of adapting future response deployment
to its history of success in preventing an intrusion.
αLADS [1] was a very early attempt to account for the effect a response would have on
the system, choosing responses based on the likelihood of resulting in a better system state.
Toth and Kruegel [24] expand on this notion and develop a measure of response negative im-
pact, recommending that the response with the minimum negative impact be selected. Wenke
Lee [10] introduced the idea of considering responses with respect to the specific intrusion
context, using an intrusion taxonomy to address unknown intrusions.
Ivan Balepin, during the development of the Automated Response Broker project [2], con-
tributed the use of system state estimation in evaluating not only the anticipated impact of
an attack, but also the expected benefit of a response. This work also uses the notion of
establishing an ordering over resources to allow system administrators to assign reasonable
values to resource impacts. The ADEPTs work [6] is the first to explicitly use the equation
RI = EI− DI (Response Impact = Effectiveness Index - Damage Index) and demonstrated its
successful application to the web-based e-commerce domain.
A high-level conceptual view of risk assessment for intrusion response has been introduced
by [8]. The proposed framework essentially presents the perceived risk of system exposure to
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intrusions as variable that can be guided by tolerable level of risk threshold. In this context,
selecting an effective response can be viewed as choosing the countermeasure that can restore
the level of exposure to the tolerable risk level. While the proposed formal model lays down
several theoretical properties of the response selection, it primarily addresses the change in
permission as a response measure, thus limiting its applicability to large pool of intrusion
response systems. On the other hand, while providing high-level concepts of benefit and cost,
the model fails to address what constitutes these metrics, limiting the implementability of the
approach.
Recent work by Marko Jahnke [9] leverages sophisticated dependency maps to enable the
assessment of cost in terms of availability, and calls out the need for additional assessment
frameworks for intrusion and confidentiality. Finally, the work by Shiau-Huey Wang et al. [25]
on assessing impact in Mobile Ad Hoc networks demonstrates the use of domain specific im-
pact calculations and leads to the intuition about combining such metrics using a common
framework.
Our approach. This work is focused on the assessment of response cost to support the
selection of autonomous, proactive, and fully automated responses. The framework in general,
however, can also be applied to passive or delayed responses, and may be extensible to include
cooperative response selection. In addition, this framework incorporates practical metrics
which can be employed by security and system administrators, and consists of well defined
quantifications for cost metric components.
22
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM METHODOLOGY
As seen in chapter 2 there are a number of factors which contribute to the intuition behind
response selection. As the work in this area has matured, some preliminary ideas for a response
cost metric have emerged:
1. The cost of the intrusion, which can be further broken down into:
(a) The damage this intrusion causes to the system.
(b) The operational costs associated with handling the intrusion, such as mandatory
reporting or loss of reputation.
2. The cost of the response, which can also be subdivided:
(a) The damage this response causes to the system.
(b) The operational costs associated with deploying this response, such as system ad-
ministrator time and additional computing resources required.
3. The likelihood that a response will be able to prevent a given intrusion.
4. The potential intrusion damage the response will prevent.
5. The likelihood that this intrusion is actually occurring, composed of:
(a) The confidence that the alert is a true positive, e.g. that it is not a false alarm.
(b) The specificity of the alert in indicating this exact intrusion, as opposed to one of a
set of intrusions out of which this is one alternative.
While these quantities are easily enumerable, the form of their combination into a workable
metric is not obvious. In addition, the subjective nature of some of these factors requires a
careful process to achieve consistent quantification.
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To address this issue, the next several sections will develop the quantification formula
in a top-down approach, first establishing high level equations, and then decomposing those
equations into lower level computations. We end this chapter with a discussion of how to
effectively assign values to the atomic quantities which drive this model, i.e. the impact of a
response on a particular resource, or the confidentiality value of a system.
We assume for this discussion that the organization has established a security policy which
applies to each system, and which allows the value of a system to the organization to be
expressed in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C, I, A). In this context, we
consider the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system or a service to be the degree
to which that system or service is able to preserve those qualities.
3.1 Computing the expected response value.
First an intuitive concept of the value of a response is formed. We denote the expected
value of a response, EV, expected benefit of a response RB, and response cost RC and begin with
equation 3.1
EV = RB− RC (3.1)
This equation establishes that the cost value should be some measure of the response
benefit, discounted by some measure of the response cost. For two responses with an equal
cost then, we want to choose that which provides the largest benefit. For two responses with
an equal benefit, conversely, choose the one with the lowest cost. Therefore, higher values of
EV(r) indicate responses which are more desirable to deploy.
If one assumes that the values of RB and RC are in the range [0, 1] and have the same scale,
this formula has the additional property that positive values indicate responses which have
more benefit than they cost, and negative values indicate responses which will do more harm
than good.
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3.2 Computing the response cost.
The cost of the response, as indicated above, includes evaluating the damage the response
will cause to a system, and determining the operational costs of deploying the response. As-
suming again that these costs are on the same scale and have normalized values in the range
[0, 1], the total cost is simply the sum of the damage to the system and the operational cost
associated with the response. However, the cost of the response is dependent on the system on
which it is applied. In addition, to retain the property that the range of this value is [0, 1], we
need to normalize the value by 2 as both terms have ranges [0, 1]. Given a response r, a system
s, an impact function SI(r, s), and an operational cost value OC(r, s), we define the response
cost function RC(r, s) in equation 3.2.
RC(r, s) =
SI(r, s) + OC(r, s)
2
(3.2)
To decompose this formula further, a formal definition of a system is established, and then
the functions SI(r, s) and OC(r, s) are discussed.
3.2.1 Formal definition of system.
To provide a practical level of abstraction, we consider a system to be a composition of
resources, which is the set of services provided by the system which contribute to the system’s
value. We overload the notation of a system to also denote the set of resources in a system s.
Specifically, for a set of resources in a system, {R ∈ s}, and an assigned value of the system to
an organization vs, the sum of the individual values of those resources is equal to the system
value: vs =
∑
Ri∈s vRi . Note that this value may be expressed either in a static quantity, (e.g.
dollars), or in quantity per unit time (e.g. dollars per minute).
Returning to the system policy in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C, I,A),
this policy can be used as a set of weights with range [0, 1] which, when applied to the system
value, decompose it into these three dimensions. Formally, we define a system security policy
as SPs = (wC , wI , wA) such that 0 ≤ w{C,I,A} ≤ 1.
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Finally, we assign each resource Ri ∈ s an impact along each of these dimensions: 0 ≤
Impact(Ri, X) ≤ 1, X ∈ {C, I,A} where a value of 0 indicates that a compromise of the
resource will have no affect on that security dimension, and a 1 indicates that a compromise
of the resource would completely impair it.
3.2.2 Decomposing SI(r, s)
The system impact function is defined in terms of the system resources and the system
security policy as discussed above. Intuitively we need to consider the impact of a response on
the set of system resources, with resources having a greater impact on the value of the system
receiving more consideration.
Remembering that each value wX , X ∈ {C, I,A} is between 0 and 1 and for each re-
source, Impact(Ri,X) is also between 0 and 1, we can define the product of these weights
(Impact(Ri,X) × wX) as the overall impact of resource Ri’s security aspect X on the value
of the system. A value of 1 for this product indicates a complete loss in system value if that
aspect of the resource is lost, and a value of 0 indicates no value impact at all.
This definition is formalized in Equation 3.3, where Impact(Ri, X) is the impact of resource
Ri on security goal X ∈ {C, I,A} as defined above and Damager,Ri is an administrator defined






Damager,RX × Impact(R,X)× wX (3.3)
In order to scale this value to the range [0, 1], a factor must be used to normalize SI(r, s).
Noting that the quantity is unit-less, choosing the maximum possible impact of a response (i.e.
if all system resources were completely damaged), will yield a value with the desired range
[0, 1].
3.2.3 Decomposing OC(r, s)
Compared to SI(r, s), the operational cost function OC(r, s) is fairly simple. Examples of
the types of costs which should be included in this value are:
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1. Man-hours of labor required to deploy or manage the response.
2. Direct costs associated with a response, for instance, paying a fee to a third-party.
3. Additional resources used to support a response, such as disk-space or network bandwidth
for additional logging.
Because the operational cost is derived from factors which include organization and system
dependent values, this cost is directly assigned by the organization. A method for the consistent
determination of these cost factors will be discussed further in section 3.5
The formal definition, equation 3.4, consists of the organization-assigned system value, vs,
and the organization assigned associated cost. It is assumed that, if the operational cost alone
of a response is greater than the value of the system, the response will not be considered for





3.3 Computing the intrusion cost.
The method to calculate the intrusion cost is identical to that of the response cost. The
only difference is that, where the operational cost of a response is not assumed to exceed the
system value, and thus should fall between 0 and 1 after normalization, no such assumption
is made for the operational cost of an intrusion. Thus it is possible for the operational cost of
intrusion q, OC(q, s), to be greater than 1.
The formal definition of IC(q, s) is defined in equation 3.5, and the equation components
SI(q, s) and OC(q, s) are completely analagous to equations 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. The only
significant difference is that, given the unbounded operational cost component, the range for
this function is 0 ≤ IC(q, s). However, the interpretation still stands that, e.g. IC(q, s) = 2
indicates an intrusion cost of twice the approximated system value.
IC(q, s) = SI(q, s) + OC(q, s) (3.5)
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While we have defined a metric for IC(q, s) giving the expected cost of intrusion q on system
s, the overall expected value of a response depends separately on the components of IC, and
not on the quantity as a whole. Thus the notation IC(q, s) will not appear in the equations
below, however SI(q, s) and OC(q, s) appear separately.
3.4 Computing the response benefit.
The benefit of a response is the expected reduction in cost resulting from the response’s
ability to prevent some or all of the damage resulting from an intrusion. This benefit com-
putation should take into account both the resources protected by the response should the
intrusion continue to progress, and the cost reduction if the intrusion is prevented entirely.
For instance, a response which moves sensitive files to a more secure system may not stop
the intrusion, but may prevent the cost associated with the disclosure of those files. Thus the
system impact will be reduced, but the operational costs associated with the intrusion will
not. However, an alternative response which effectively blocks the attack will both prevent the
system damage and the operational cost.
Therefore it is desirable that the benefit computation express how much protection the
response will provide to system resources and the probability estimate that the response will
prevent the intrusion. To accommodate this, response benefit is defined in equation 3.6 as a
function of the intrusion cost components, modified by the expected reduction in both system
impact and operational cost of that intrusion if this response is deployed. In this equation we




SIReduction(r, SI(q, s)) + OCReduction(r, OC(q, s)) (3.6)
As stated above the two reduction components are computed separately. The first deter-
mines the expected reduction in system damage from the response, and is defined in equation
3.7. The second estimates the probability that the intrusion will be prevented entirely, giving
the expected reduction in operational cost. This is presented in equation 3.8.
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SIReduction(r, q, s) = Prob(q)× Cov(r, q, s) (3.7)
OCReduction(r, q, s) = Prob(q)× SF(r, q, s)× OC(q, s) (3.8)
Equations 3.7 and 3.8 share the probability that this intrusion is actually occurring Prob(q)
Prob(q) is a function of the indicators of q and is assigned by a system administrator. A
methodological approach to assigning this value is mentioned in section 3.5.
The reduction in system impact is a function of the resource aspects protected by the
response. For instance, if an intrusion will damage the availability of a web server process,
and a response will protect the availability of that process, the response reduces the system
damage of the intrusion.
However, the probability that the attack will be entirely thwarted does not necessarily
depend on how much damage is prevented. Often there is a key component to an intrusion
which must exist for that intrusion to succeed. Thus, the more interference a response causes
to an intrusion, the more likely it is to prevent the intrusion from succeeding. To address
this, only the resource security facet overlap (SF(r, q, s)), and not coverage, is considered in
the estimate of this value.
Providing an accurate estimate of SF(r, q, s), while dependent on the interference of the
response, also includes a probability component drawn from past history. Regardless of the
estimated chance of success, the most accurate information regarding the probability of future
success is how well the response has performed previously. Thus we need to not only consider
the estimated probability of success based on a resource analysis, but also account, in propor-
tion to the statistical validity of the quantity, for the degree of success in past deployments.
We define the notation Impact(q,Ri,X) to indicate that intrusion q damages security aspect
X of resource Ri, and similarly the degree of protection provided to a security facet of a resource
by a response is denoted by Prot(r,Ri,X). The value rsuccessful is the number of times this
response has been successful in the past, and rn is the total number of times this response has
been deployed in the past. When rn = 0, we consider 1/rn = 1. One problem in incorporating
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this factor is the potential for response effectiveness to change over time, but for the model
to keep the response “stuck” with a poor history. Possible techniques to address this problem
include the use of a sliding window or periodic resets of rn and rsuccessful.
In the SF(r, q, s) equation, Equation 3.9, we look at the expected protection offered by
this response against this intrusion for all resource security facets as an apriori estimate of the
expected response success. As the response is tested through deployment, the historical success
rate is accumulated, and that value is included with a weight proportional to the amount of
historical data available.
SF(r, q, s) =
( |Ri,X∈{C,I,A} protected by r|
|Ri,X∈{C,I,A} impacted by q|
)
× (1/rn) + rSuccess
rn
× (1− 1/rn) (3.9)
Coverage is computed similarly to success factor, but with two important differences:
1. The success factor only accounts for the resources which are protected by a response, but
does not consider the actual cost reduction of the response considered in the coverage
computation.
2. The success factor includes a historical component. As the response is deployed, the
success rate of the response is tallied and this information is used to adjust the success
factor as appropriate. The coverage does not include such a component.
Coverage expresses the degree of expected protection a response will afford against a given
intrusion. This is subtly different from the expectation of success; in this case we are only
interested in the degree to which the resource security facets will be protected by a response,
not the likelihood that the intrusion will be entirely prevented. A formalized notion of coverage
is given in Equation 3.10.





MAX(0, (Protr,Ri,X −Impactr,Ri,X ))×Impact(Ri, X))×wX (3.10)
Coverage is based on the sum of the impact of an intrusion against each resource facet
weighted by the difference between the protection offered that resource facet by the response
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and the negative impact of the response on that same resource facet. Each element of the sum
is weighted by the overall importance of that security facet to the system as a whole.
The coverage computation introduces the somewhat counterintuitive concept of a resource
both protecting and damaging the same facet of a resource. One example of this might be the
case when a network service is being attacked by a distributed denial of service (DDOS). In
this case, the response block all network traffic may protect the availability of the resource by
stopping the DDOS, but at the same time it has a severe negative impact on the availability
because no network clients can access the resource any more. Therefore, the net contribution
to Cov(r, q, s) of that response on that resource should be close to 0.
3.5 Methodology for gathering data:
The equations developed above compute the expected value of a response, derived from the
following basic quantities:
1. The overall value of the system to an organization.
2. The security policy of the system, in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
3. The enumerated resources in the system, and their potential to impact confidentiality,
integrity, and availability on that system.
4. The set of defined intrusion alerts, representing known threats to the system. Each
element of this set has an associated operational cost, and a vector denoting the impact
of each intrusion on each resource security aspect.
5. The set of defined responses, representing actions the response system can take. Each
element of this set has an associated operational cost, a vector denoting the impact
of each response on each resource security aspect, and a vector denoting the degree of
protection conferred upon each resource security aspect.
6. The probability that a specific intrusion is actually occurring, given its associated intru-
sion alert.
Some of these quantities are quite subjective in nature, and in order to achieve a consistent
evaluation of intrusion cost, response cost, and response value across systems, a concrete
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methodology needs to be established for determining these subjective values.
The goal is not to ensure that precisely the same value will be produced by two differ-
ent administrators working under the same conditions, but that both administrators, having
applied this methodology, will be confident that the resulting values are reasonable based on
their independent assessments of the responses, intrusions, and systems.
We will illustrate the methodology mentioned here through the use of an ongoing example:
a public web hosting server.
3.5.1 Determining the system value.
The system value is a quantification of its importance to the system owner. Only the system
owner can define this value, and it will necessarily vary between environments. As mentioned
above, this value has a unit of either absolute economic value (e.g. dollars) or economic value
per unit time (e.g. dollars per minute). There is a significant body of work related to the
problem of assessing a system’s value, some of which overlaps significantly with the fields of
risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis of security controls [27].
To demonstrate this methodology, we will maintain a running example of a system valued
at $20, 000.
3.5.2 Assigning the security policy.
The security policy consists of a set of values, one each for confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. These values are weights in the range [0, 1], and indicate how much of the system
value is attributed to that security aspect. Setting these values is a matter of determining how
much of the system value would be lost with the loss of one of these security goals.
For the example web server, users are advised that minimal effort is made to assure confi-
dentiality, as pages posted are assumed to be available for the public. Thus the confidentiality
of the system does not add much to its value. On the other hand, the integrity of the data
posted by users, and the guarantee of their website availability are the mainstays of the web
hosting business. Therefore, the policy is defined as in Table 3.1
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Table 3.1 A security policy for an example public web hosting server.
Resource C I A
HTTP Service 1 1 1
SFTP Service 0 1 1
Table 3.2 A set of resources for an example public web hosting server.
3.5.3 Enumerating system resources.
Once the system value is assigned, the next step is to enumerate the resources which
need to be protected. Many approaches attempt to capture a comprehensive or structured
set of resources in a system, however in practice this is daunting for system administrators.
In addition the complexity of the resulting model may lead to a reduced confidence in the
correctness of the model, and the more detailed the enumeration is, the more impact small
changes in system state will have on the evaluation of a response or intrusion impact.
The focus for this methodology is on high-level applications or resources. For instance,
a system administrator might assign to a public web server a set of resources consisting of
{http service, sftp service}. While the system itself is a complex set of interdependent
resources and services, this abstraction allows the system administrator to assign values based
on their experience and intuition.
The set of resources enumerated for the example system, along with the resource weights,
is given in Table 3.2
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3.5.4 Assigning resource impact weights.
Each resource is assigned a tuple of weights, one for each security goal in the system,
indicating the potential impact the resource can have on that system security goal. Each
weight is assigned by the system administrator for each category with the goal of allowing
the response selection computation to distinguish between which resources are critical to a
particular security goal and which are less important.
Therefore, while the weight can be any real number, we restrict the system administrator to
establishing a total ordering on the resource impacts for each security category, and selecting
the maximum and minimum impact in this order. In this way we achieve a maximum separation
between adjacent resources in the order, allowing the greatest distinction between resource
impacts on each security category.
For the public web hosting service, the http service, if compromised, will impact confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability completely. On the other hand, the sftp service, used
only for posting new content, can only impact the integrity and availability of the server, but
not the confidentiality. The result of following this process is displayed in Table 3.2.
3.5.5 Assigning response impact values.
Assigning response impact values also consists of assigning weights to security categories,
but in contrast to the resources, response impacts weights are assigned according to the degree
of adverse impact a response will have on a resource’s security category.
With the goal of maximum distinction, we again use the partial ordering approach to let the
system administrator first order responses and then set the maximum and minimum impacts
in the ordering for the security category on that particular resource.
Following the example, we will consider the following four responses:
Block host in .htaccess file – blocks a host from access to a specific area of the web site. The
web server still processes the URL request.
Block host with iptables firewall rule – blocks a host from any network access. The kernel
drops the packet before it gets to user space.
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Shutdown the HTTP service – Makes the HTTP service completely unavailable.
Shutdown the SFTP service – Makes the SFTP service completely unavailable.
We will step through this process for one resource facet, the availability of the HTTP
service. The other security facets are handled similarly, and the result is listed (along with the
response protection assessment) in Table 3.3.
To evaluate the impact of responses on a specific resource the establishment and use of a
total order is used again. Once ordered (possibly with some responses having equal effect) from
least to greatest impact, the damage weight for responses with rank i is assigned according to
the formula inequiv−1 , where nequiv is the number of distinct equivalent sets in the ordering.
In this example then:
1. The response Shutdown the SFTP service will have no impact on HTTP availability, so
it is assigned a value of 0. The response Shutdown the HTTP service on the other hand,
will have full impact so it is given a ranking of 1.
2. The response Block host in .htaccess file, while having some impact on the availability of
the web service, has less impact than blocking all IP traffic, so it is ranked at 0 < k1 <
k2 < 1, while Block host with iptables firewall rule is given a ranking of k2.
3. Since the number of equivalent response sets in this ordering (not including those with
no impact at all) is 3, the weight assigned to Block host in .htaccess file is 1/3 = 0.33,
and that assigned to Block host with iptables firewall rule is 2/3 = 0.67.
3.5.6 Assigning response operational cost.
Response operational cost is computed as the sum of non-system impact costs of deploying
a response divided by the value of the system. Determining the non-system impact costs of a
response can be daunting, however, a few guidelines are suggested to make the process more
consistent.
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Block host in .htaccess file
Damaged Protected
C I A C I A
HTTP Service 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 0
SFTP Service 0 0 0 0 0 0
Block host with iptables firewall rule
Damaged Protected
C I A C I A
HTTP Service 0 0 0.66 0.66 1 1
SFTP Service 0 0 0.5 0 0 1
Shutdown the HTTP service
Damaged Protected
C I A C I A
HTTP Service 0 0 1 1 1 0
SFTP Service 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shutdown the SFTP service
Damaged Protected
C I A C I A
HTTP Service 0 0 0 0 1 0
SFTP Service 0 0 1 1 1 0
Table 3.3 A set of responses for an example public web hosting server.
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In general, three broad categories cover the majority of response operational cost factors:
the labor associated with the response (i.e., man-hours required to either deploy or recover
from the effect of it), the direct costs involved in the response (i.e., paying a third party fee),
and the additional resources required to implement the response (i.e., additional disk space or
bandwidth consumed on other systems).
These values are estimated using organization specific assessment methods, and the re-
sulting cost is divided by the total value of the system. This yields the (unit-less) relative
operational cost of the response.
In the web hosting service scenario, assume that a system administrator is hired to keep
the system running normally, and that the minimum one-hour charge for her services is $200.
When either the HTTP or SFTP services are stopped, this individual will need to log in,
review the circumstances of shutdown, and restart the services. Thus the operational cost of
these two responses will be $200$20000 = 0.01. The other two responses do not involve any system
administrator overhead, and thus have an operational cost of 0.
3.5.7 Assigning response protection values.
To evaluate the degree of protection a response confers upon a resource, an administrator
must consider the degree to which potential damage to a specific resource aspect may be
prevented by the response. For instance, given a database service, if the database is shutdown,
there is a degree of protection given to the confidentiality of the database. If the database
state is restored from a backup, there is protection of both availability and integrity.
It is assumed in this work that response actions are purposefully implemented and made
available for deployment to counter a specific set of threats to security resource aspects. For
instance, typically firewalls are put in place to permit the response of blocking an IP address,
preserving at least the confidentiality of the network ports protected by it.
This task can be viewed as a process of translating those purposes into specific protections
for specific resources. While the range of this value is a real number in [0, 1], again it is prefer-
able to maximize the distinction between the effectiveness of different responses. Therefore, a
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similar process to that for assigning response system impact based on a total order.
Given the response set for this example, consider the confidentiality aspect of the HTTP
service. The following process is followed by the system owner:
1. The response Shutdown the SFTP service will offer no protection for HTTP confidential-
ity, so it is assigned a value of 0. The response Shutdown the HTTP service on the other
hand, will maximally protect HTTP confidentiality, so that response is given a value of
1.
2. The response Block host in .htaccess file, will protect the confidentiality of the part of the
site it is deployed at and so is given a ranking of k1, where 0 < k1 < k2 < 1. Block host
with iptables firewall rule is given a ranking of k2 because it will offer more protection,
blocking access to the entire site.
3. Since the number of equivalent response sets in this partial order (not including those
offering no protection at all) is 3, the weight assigned to Block host in .htaccess file is
1/3 = 0.33, and that assigned to Block host with iptables firewall rule is 2/3 = 0.67.
3.5.8 Assigning intrusion impact values.
Intrusion impact is a similar concept to response impact, with a slight distinction during
the assignment: impact on a resource security goal is restricted to the set {0, 1} rather than
the range [0, 1].
There is no indication apriori of the degree to which an intrusion with the potential to
damage a resource actually will damage that resource. Therefore, if an intrusion has the
capability to damage a resource security aspect, it is given a weight of 1 for that aspect.
Otherwise, it is given a weight of 0. Making this determination is left up to the system
administrator and the security officer in charge of defining the security alerts.
The example system has the following set of possible intrusion alerts:
Buffer overflow in URL request – A URL request matching the buffer overflow signature is
detected.
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Buffer overflow in URL request
Damaged
C I A
HTTP Service 1 1 1
SFTP Service 0 0 0
Shell command execution attempt
Damaged
C I A
HTTP Service 1 1 1
SFTP Service 0 0 0
Attempt to read /etc/passwd file
Damaged
C I A
HTTP Service 0 0 0
SFTP Service 1 1 1
Table 3.4 A set of intrusions for an example public web hosting server.
Shell command execution attempt – A valid shell command string is identified in an HTTP
request.
Attempt to read /etc/passwd file – An attempt to traverse the filesystem and read entries in
/etc/passwd is detected.
Based on the system administrator’s intuition, this set of intrusion is assigned impacts
according to Table 3.4
3.5.9 Assigning intrusion operational cost.
Intrusion operational cost is computed in the same manner as the response operational
cost, however as mentioned above, intrusion operational cost has a range > 0. In the case of
intrusions we also have three broad categories into which most operational costs fall: the labor
associated with manually mitigating or addressing an intrusion, the loss of reputation to the
organization due to the intrusion occurring, and direct costs for contracted services such as
forensic analysis.
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Attack Time to Remediate Rate Operational Cost
Buffer overflow in URL request 1 hour $200 $200+$1000$20000 = 0.06
Shell command execution attempt 3 hours $200 $600+$1000$20000 = 0.08
Attempt to read /etc/passwd file 5 hours $200 $1000+$1000$20000 = 0.10
Table 3.5 Intrusion Operational Costs for an example public web hosting
server.
In the web server hosting example, mandatory reporting requirements cost $1000 for any
intrusion, regardless of severity. In addition, system recovery takes time according to Table
3.5.
3.5.10 Determining intrusion probability.
While in general the probability of an intrusion actually occurring is difficult to determine,
the value needed here is actually the probability that the intrusion is occurring, given that
we have received an alarm indicating that it is occurring p(Q|Alarm). We can determine this
directly by keeping a count of the number of times a specific alert is received, and having an
administrator provide input on the number of times the intrusion actually occurred from the
set of alarms.
This gives an estimate of the confidence with which this alert source indicates a true
intrusion. In addition, it may be necessary to ascertain the probability that a specific intrusion
out of a set of possible intrusions indicated by an alarm is occurring. This can be restated as
the probability that, given an alarm indicating a true intrusion, the specific intrusion occurring
is the one under consideration. We can denote this as the probability p(q ∈ Q|Alarm), and
again this can be estimated by tracking the number of times the alarm is sent and an intrusion
actually occurs, and the number of times intrusion q that occurred.
A body of knowledge around accurately estimating this type of probability exists, and
further details are referred to appropriate papers. A starting point is found in [4], and a
recent IDS specific approach is [7]. For this discussion the assumption is made that the
intrusion probability is an assigned value provided as an input along with the alert.
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CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS
To gain further understanding about how this framework integrates with varying system
policies, two implementations were developed. A Java simulation is implemented to allow
interactive testing, and an implementation in C is written to test the performance of the
framework on a Linux host. Details of these implementations are given below, and the results
of the experiments using them are presented in section 4.2
4.1 Implementation
4.1.1 Java applet/servlet simulation
The majority of the Java implementation consists of an applet containing the computations
related to the framework. The user interface is a simple GUI which allows the user to input
the following:
1. System policy in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
2. List of system resources and the impact of each resource on system Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability.
3. List of responses available to the system, along with the operational cost of the response,
the impact of the response on each resource security characteristic, and the degree of
protection offered by the response to each resource security characteristic.
4. List of intrusions in the attack profile to be considered, along with the operational cost
of the intrusion and the impact of the intrusion on each resource security characteristic.
The simulation can then be run by clicking a button. The user is directed to give their own
ranking of the available responses in order of most preferred to least preferred, a self-evaluation
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of their experience level, and their primary work area (academic, industry, or both). The user
is then given a comparison of the ranking they selected with that selected by the simulation,
and feedback is requested from the user about the differences. When submitted, the applet
communicates with a Java servlet to transmit the results, which are then written to a file on
the server.
This implementation allows a system administrator to select input values based on their in-
tuition about the system security goals, construct a test intrusion scenario, and then determine
if the proposed framework selects responses which match the actions the system administrator
would take.
In addition to running the simulation and viewing the results, there are “save” and “load”
options which write and read XML formatted files so that system definitions can be re-used
later, or shared with others. This is particularly important if the results of the trial are to be
independently verified, or re-used for the evaluation of other proposed models.
Finally, an option to show the calculations will export the values computed at different
stages of the computation to a comma separated value file, suitable for loading into an Excel
spreadsheet. This allows a level of transparency, enabling users to determine why (according
to the model) one response is preferred to another.
A diagram of the implementation design is given in Figure 4.1
4.1.2 Host based implementation in C
The implementation for host-based cost-sensitive response on the Linux platform is written
in C for performance evaluation. The goal is to provide timing data, and verify the feasibil-
ity of effectively responding to real-world attacks. There are several pieces of code in this
implementation:
selectResponse.c This code implements the framework calculations. Compiled as an object
file, the defined methods take structure arguments which represent the system, resources,
responses, intrusions, and the attack profile under consideration. The ultimate result is
the selection and execution of a response on the system.
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Figure 4.1 IRS simulation in Java.
simulatedIDS.c A socket-client code which takes alerts from a Snort data source and converts
them to the defined message protocol to input into the response selection engine. UDP
sockets are used to transmit messages.
selectResponseRun.c The data loading and socket interface for the response selection en-
gine. This code opens a listening UDP socket, and waits for alert messages indicating
a potential intrusion. When all alerts for a potential intrusion are received, an attack
profile structure is created and passed to the response selection code.
selectResponseGetValues.c An alternate interface to the response selection engine. Instead
of actually deploying a response, this code allows the generation of output in a human
readable form. Similar to the “show calculations” option in the Java implementation,
this permits users to see the costs and values as computed during the intrusion response
selection process.
Execution occurs in two phases: initialization and monitoring. During the initialization
phase, system security policy, set of available resources, available responses, and the definition
of known intrusions are loaded into the framework and the appropriate data structures are
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constructed. This data is stored in four text files which are given as arguments on the command
line.
Once the model is initialized, a UDP socket is opened to receive connections from data input
sources and the system waits until an intrusion notification is sent. An intrusion notification
consists of four parts:
1. The intrusion name. This name must exist in the set of known intrusions, or the alert is
ignored.
2. A unique identification value (IID) for this set of intrusions. This value indicates the
alert messages which are part of the same potential intrusion.
3. The number of intrusions which are included in this set of possible intrusions.
4. The probability that this specific intrusion is actually occurring.
When all alerts with the same IID have been received and added to the attack profile
data structure, the attack profile is passed to the response selection engine, which evaluates
the responses in the context of the profile and chooses one to deploy. This implementation is
designed as in Figure 4.2.
Model changes in the implementation. There are a few minor changes made to the
framework in the implementation for aesthetic reasons:
1. Both implementations normalize the response system impact and intrusion damage using
the max possible damage. The maximum possible impact may vary greatly from system
to system depending on the number of resources and the security policy assigned to
the system. Using this value to normalize SI gives a relative value which can then be
compared across systems and organizations to ensure that SI is always in the range (0, 1).
2. Both implementations divide the response cost and intrusion cost by 2. Since both
OC and SI have range (0, 1) to start with, the sum has a range (0, 2). Dividing by 2
normalizes the cost range of each to (0, 1).
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Figure 4.2 Host-based IRS implementation for Linux systems in C.
4.2 Results
Evaluating the effectiveness of a proposed system of measurement in a domain such as this is
complicated by a lack of existing standards with which to compare. There are no established
units or scale for many of the quantities considered, and this leads to a lack of provable
characteristics. In light of these difficulties, we take an empirical approach and establish
through experimentation that this framework is correct, intuitive, and useful.
4.2.1 Correctness
To establish the correctness of this framework two questions are considered: the lack of
obvious flaws in the model, and the improvement in the cost benefit of automated response
compared to static response selection.
Definition of a rational response. In order to determine if this approach is funda-
mentally flawed, the concept of a rational response value was established. It is a set of charac-
teristics which should always be true of any value assigned to a response. A suite of scenarios
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No impact → no cost
Only valueless impact → no cost
No OC, subset impact → 0 ≤ costi ≤ 0.5
No OC, full impact → cost = 0.5
OC = 1, no impact → cost = 0.5
OC = 1, full impact → cost = 1
Response to no impact (any OC) → no benefit
Resource impact and protection → Include impact cost
Impact coverage loss
No Success Factor loss
Table 4.1 Rational Selection Axioms
System Resources
Name C I A
AllOnes 1 1 1
OnlyConf 1 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0
Table 4.2 The system definition used to demonstrate rationality.
is developed in order to test whether a specific response selection engine can be classified as
rational. The set of axioms defined is given in Table 4.1
For simplicity, the term ’resource’ above refers to a specific security goal of a resource
(Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability).
To demonstrate rationality as defined above, a set of inputs is defined to test each of these
conditions. The defined system, intrusions, and responses are given in Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4
respectively.
The results of these tests are given for response cost in Table 4.5, response benefit in
Table 4.6, and overall response value in Table 4.7.
These results only demonstrate that the response system does not make irrational cost
assessments. However, it does not determine that the cost assessments are accurate.
Comparison with a static response system. To determine the cost benefit provided
by this approach, the response selection framework is adapted as a plugin tool for an intrusion
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Name Operational Cost Resources Damaged
Name C I A
No Impact 0 AllOnes 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0
OnlyOC 1 AllOnes 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0
PartialSI 0 AllOnes 0 1 0
OnlyConf 1 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0
AllSI 0 AllOnes 1 1 1
OnlyConf 1 1 1
NoValue 1 1 1
OnlyNovalue 0 AllOnes 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0
NoValue 1 1 1
FullImpact 1 AllOnes 1 1 1
OnlyConf 1 1 1
NoValue 1 1 1
Table 4.3 The intrusion set used to demonstrate rationality.
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Name Operational Cost Resources
Name C I A C I A
No Impact 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0 0 0 0
Only OC 1 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0 0 0 0
PartialSI 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 1 0 0 0 0
OnlyConf 1 0 0 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0 0 0 0
AllOnesSI 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 1 1 1 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0 0 0 0
OnlyNoValue 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0 0 0 0
NoValue 1 1 1 0 0 0
Full Impact 1 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 1 1 1 0 0 0
OnlyConf 1 1 1 0 0 0
NoValue 1 1 1 0 0 0
Protect NoValue 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 0 0 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0 0 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0 1 1 1
Protect Partial 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 0 1 0
OnlyConf 0 0 0 1 0 0
NoValue 0 0 0 0 0 0
Protect Full 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 1 1 1
OnlyConf 0 0 0 1 1 1
NoValue 0 0 0 1 1 1
Protect Disjoint 0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 0 0 0 1 0 1
OnlyConf 0 0 0 0 1 1
NoValue 0 0 0 1 1 1
Everything 1.0 Damaged Protected
AllOnes 1 1 1 1 1 1
OnlyConf 1 1 1 1 1 1
NoValue 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.4 The response set used to demonstrate rationality.
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Response Name NoImpact OnlyNovalue OnlyOC PartialSI AllSI FullImpact
NoImpact 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OnlyNovalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OnlyOC 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
PartialSI 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
AllOnesSI 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375
FullImpact 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
PNovalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PDisjoint 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PPartial 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PFull 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Everything 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 4.5 Results of the rational response cost test.
Response Name NoImpact OnlyNovalue OnlyOC PartialSI AllSI FullImpact
NoImpact 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OnlyNovalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OnlyOC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PartialSI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AllOnesSI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FullImpact 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PNovalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167
PDisjoint 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.750
PPartial 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.167 0.500
PFull 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.500 1.000
Everything 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500
Table 4.6 Results of rational response benefit test.
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Response Name NoImpact OnlyNovalue OnlyOC PartialSI AllSI FullImpact
NoImpact 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OnlyNovalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OnlyOC -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500
PartialSI -0.250 -0.250 -0.250 -0.250 -0.250 -0.250
AllOnesSI -0.375 -0.375 -0.375 -0.375 -0.375 -0.375
FullImpact -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000
PNovalue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167
PDisjoint 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.750
PPartial 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.167 0.500
PFull 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.500 1.000
Everything -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -0.500
Table 4.7 Results of rational response value test.
detection system (Snort) and a series of experiments are performed.
Results. We evaluate our model using the 1998 DARPA/Lincoln Lab oﬄine evaluation data,
in particular week 5 for days Monday, Thursday, and Friday, and week 6 on Thursday. The
tcpdump data is replayed and Snort, an open source signature-based IDS, is used to generate
alerts. Although Snort has been shown to perform poorly on DARPA data sets [3], it is freely
available to general public and is currently one of the most widely used IDSs. In addition,
since the focus of this work is not on the performance of intrusion detection approaches, it is
appropriate to employ Snort in our experiments.
In these experiments the goal is to show the cost saved by dynamically selecting the lowest
cost response compared with the cost of always deploying a statically assigned response. Static
response assignment can be implemented in several ways. In these experiments, it is assumed
to be implemented as a reflex response, where alerts seen from an IP address trigger an imme-
diate static response. Based on the number of available scripts on the Internet implementing
automated blocks of IP addresses along with experience, blocking the source IP address is
chosen as the static response to deploy.
The cost is computed according to this framework, with the parameters defined by a sys-
tem administrator for each system type. While this is, in a sense, self-selecting, the goal is
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not to demonstrate intuitiveness, but to show that, under the assumption that an adminis-
trator assigns cost values according to their intuition, the proposed framework is unilaterally
more cost-effective. The cumulative response cost metric as the primary criteria, showing the
cumulative value of all responses deployed on the system over time.
The characteristics of these systems are given in Table 4.8, and the distribution of alerts
generated by Snort are given in Table 4.9. The results of the experiments in comparison
to a traditional system equipped with a static intrusion response mechanism are given in
Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5.
In these figures, the difference between the cost-sensitive cumulative value and the static
response cumulative value is shown by the separation between the lines. As time goes on,
the value of the static response tends to remain around zero for the high integrity and avail-
ability systems, while the cost-sensitive response attains significantly more value throughout
the experiment. In the high confidentiality system, however, the static response is much more
competitive, with the cost-sensitive approach only achieving appreciable advantage toward the
end of the trial.
This is explained by the choice of static response, block attacker IP. This response protects
confidentiality at the expense of availability. Thus, it is generally desireable for network based
attacks detected by snort in the high-confidentiality system, but the other two systems retain
more value by choosing other, less costly responses such as making the file system read-only.
This indicates that, even in systems where the security priority is heavily in favor of a specific
static response, a cost-sensitive approach will still outperform the static approach over time.
In addition to cumulative cost, the number of times each response is deployed is given
in Tables 4.10, 4.11, 4.12. From these tables it is apparent that in some cases, e.g. for the
high-confidentiality system, the number of responses on which the two approaches disagree
can be very minor. However, when they do disagree, the value difference for the system can
be significant. While these simulated trials were run over a period of roughly four days, many
systems remain deployed for years. The implementation of a cost-sensitive response capability
will significantly reduce the overall impact of detected intrusions over the life of such systems.
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System legend: public web server providing remote access for affiliates and public information
System security priorities: low confidentiality 0.1, moderate integrity 0.5, high availability 0.9.
System legend: central file repository for distributed collaboration
System security priorities: moderate confidentiality 0.5, high integrity 0.9, low availability 0.1.
System legend: Medical information system for a hospital
System security priorities: high confidentiality 0.9, high integrity 0.9, low availability 0.1.
System Resources: System responses:
Web server (providing web access to files for users) Block Attacker’s address in .htaccess
FTP server (providing FTP access to get and post files) Block Attacker’s IP Address in Firewall
RPC server (providing remote procedures used by some Restart Service (Web, FTP, RPC, or SNMP)
of the web services and possibly clients) Reboot System
SNMP server (used for system monitoring and Stop Service
management by the administrator) Disable User Logins
Disable specific user account
Table 4.8 The characteristics of the hypothetical systems used in the experiments.
ATTACK-RESPONSES 28 SNMP 2943
BACKDOOR-MISC-Solaris-2.5-attempt 1 TFTP-Get 400
FINGER-/-execution-attempt 18 WEB-CGI 222
FTP-.rhosts 1 WEB-FRONTPAGE 13
RPC-portmap-listing-TCP-111 2 WEB-IIS 18
RSERVICES-rsh-root 1 WEB-MISC 20
SCAN-myscan 30 X11-xopen 1
SHELLCODE-sparc-NOOP 9
Table 4.9 Snort alert classes generated by DARPA data
Dynamic Response Static Response
No Response 2741 No Response 3653
Block SNMP Request 927 Block SNMP Request -
Block Attacker .htaccess 35 Block Attacker .htaccess -
Block Attacker IP 4 Block Attacker IP 54
Table 4.10 The number of times each response was deployed on the
DARPA data for the high availability system.
Dynamic Response Static Response
No Response 3856 No Response 3821
Block Attacker IP 20 Block Attacker IP 55
Table 4.11 The number of times each response was deployed on the
DARPA data for the high confidentiality system.
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Figure 4.3 Evaluation of the response on a system with high availability requirements
(public web server).
4.2.2 Scalability
An important feature of an IRS is its ability to respond in a timely fashion. One concern
for this framework is the impact which a large number of resources, responses, or potentially
occurring intrusions could have on performance. While the number of potential intrusions
known is also a factor, implementation using hash-tables makes the performance impact of
this quantity a constant factor.
Performance. A set of experiments were conducted to measure the performance of the intru-
sion response selection algorithm on artificial data sets. The experiments were run on Intel(R)
Core(TM)2 Duo CPU with a clock speed of 1.33GHz and 1 GB of RAM. The experiments are
performed on three primary variables: number of system resources, number of responses avail-
able in the system and number of suspected intrusions. For each trial, the other two parameters
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Figure 4.4 Evaluation of the response on a system with high confidentiality requirements
(medical information system).
remained fixed at 100. The results of these experiments, given in Figure 4.6, show that even
for a system with a significantly large number of resources to consider, the computation time
for the best response strategy is only 0.015s. As Figure 4.6 shows, the highest impact on per-
formance is the number of suspected intrusions simultaneously considered during the response
selection process. As such it took 0.221s to assess the available responses for 10000 suspected
intrusions. While we consider very large sets of intrusions, in reality there are generally only
a few possible intrusions to consider.
These results show that this approach has reasonable process time requirements, suitable
for the efficient analysis of response selection in an automatic setting, as well as in support of
manual response assessment during an administrator’s daily routine.
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Figure 4.5 Evaluation of the response on a system with high integrity requirements (cen-
tral file repository).
4.2.3 Intuitiveness
To determine the comparative effectiveness of this approach, it is compared to a system
deploying a static response, and to a system implementing the ADEPTS IRS [6]. Given the
tradeoffs made for the sake of implementability, performance and simplicity, it is expected that
cost effectiveness would not necessarily exceed that of some of the formal approaches to cost
evaluation.
In addition to comparing with static response mappings, a comparison of this method with
the ADEPTS framework is performed. The ADEPTS paper presents test scenarios which are
adapted for use with this framework. A comparison of responses selected is then presented in
Table 4.16.
The scenario is in the context of an e-commerce website deployment. The example consists
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Dynamic Response Static Response
No Response - No Response 3821
Re-Mount File System readonly 3818 Re-Mount File System readonly -
Shutdown Web Service 58 Shutdown Web Service -
Block Attacker IP - Block Attacker IP 55
Table 4.12 The number of times each response was deployed on the
DARPA data for the high integrity system.
Figure 4.6 Processing time evaluation
of the following elements:
1. A set of values associated with users being able to perform certain functions (i.e. browse
the web store, place an order).
2. A set of values associated with specific security goals (i.e. corruption of MySQL database,
illegal read of file).
3. A set of attack scenarios, in which an attacker performs malicious actions with different
goals.
56
To adapt this scenario for use in this work, the following steps are taken:
1. The valued user actions have sets of resources associated with them which enable those
actions (i.e. availability of HTTP service, MySQL service).
2. The security goals are assigned dependencies on those resources (i.e. integrity of MySQL
datastore).
3. The sum of all the values in the ADEPTS examples of both the security goals and the
user actions is taken to be a representation of the overall value of the system.
4. The value contribution of each resource is then computed using the values assigned to each
of the actions or security goals depending on that resource. These values are normalized
as a ratio to the overall system value.
5. The malicious actions are associated with the resources and security goals that would
be compromised (i.e., a buffer overflow in MySQL would results in a confidentiality,
availability, and integrity loss for the MySQL service).
6. The system security policy (C, I,A) is computed from the values assigned to various
security goals and the security policy area those security goals is implied (i.e. MySQL
integrity contributes to system integrity).
7. Since the attack actions are known apriori to be true positives, the intrusion probability
is set to 1.
8. A set of possible responses is enumerated, using the responses mentioned in the ADEPTS
paper.
This adaptation effectively determines all of the information required for this model, and
is outlined in Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15. This natural and intuitive adaptation indicates that
our model is flexible enough to accomodate the specific implementation of ADEPTS, and is
a result of the adaptability of this framework to a variety of environments. Note that while
the converted values may not be universally intuitive to all system administrators, they do
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System Value: 565 System Policy
C = 0.372 I = 0.549 A = 0.080
Resources
Resource Name C I A
Apache Service 0.250 1.000 0.600
MySQL Service 0.750 1.000 0.600
Link to Warehouse/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.200
SSH Service 1.000 1.000 0.400
External network connection 0.500 0.667 1.000
Filesystem 0.750 0.333 0.800
Table 4.13 Framework input system adapted from ADEPTS example.
represent the intuition of the ADEPTS authors. Thus the comparison between the responses
chosen by the adepts authors as having the most value, and the values assigned by our method
is valid.
In the presentation of the ADEPTS framework, six iterations of the attack sequence are
required before Adepts will select a response which stops the attack within the first two steps.
However, the framework presented in this thesis not only selects the response which succeeds in
stopping the attack, of the two successful responses chosen by Adepts (reboot the server, and
kill crontab and block access to it), our method selects the much less costly one (kill crontab
and block access to it).
This comparison shows that, while ADEPTS has advanced capabilities in adapting to
select the correct response, the methodology developed in this thesis selects the most effective
response without requiring adaptation, resulting in a much lower cost per incidence early in
the number of intrusion iterations.
The intuitiveness of our approach is demonstrated by adapting the established character-
istics of the ADEPTS example and showing that our framework accurately selects the most
effective and beneficial response based on those inputs. It is also significant because, while
ADEPTS is targeted at web-commerce applications, the framework presented here is abstract
enough to apply across environments. In addition, in practice it is rare for system administra-
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Responses
Name OC Resources Damaged Protected
Name C I A C I A
Block web ports 0.025 Apache Service 0.000 0.000 0.333 1.000 1.000 0.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kill Apache
privilege shell 0.000 Apache Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Block source IP 0.050 Apache Service 0.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 1.000 0.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kill crontab process 0.000 Apache Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Restart Apache Service 0.000 Apache Service 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Reboot Apache Server 0.100 Apache Service 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Deny access to
crontab, kill crontab
process 0.100 Apache Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Set Apache HTTP
directory to read-only 0.100 Apache Service 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.500
Table 4.14 Framework input responses adapted from ADEPTS example.
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Intrusions
Name OC Resources Damaged
Name C I A
Apache buffer overflow 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 1.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 1.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 1.000 0.000 1.000
Filesystem 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL port scan 0.500 Apache Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
MySQL Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 0.000 0.000 0.000
MySQL buffer overflow 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 0.000 0.000
MySQL Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
Link to WH/Bank 1.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 0.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 1.000 1.000 0.000
Apache Privilege
Shell Created 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 1.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 1.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 1.000 0.000 1.000
Filesystem 1.000 1.000 1.000
Execute crontab
command 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
Link to WH/Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000
SSH Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
External network
connection 1.000 1.000 1.000
Filesystem 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tamper with Apache
files 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 1.000 1.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 1.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 1.000 0.000 1.000
Filesystem 1.000 1.000 1.000
Enumerate webstore
docroot using ’ls’ 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 0.000 0.000
MySQL Service 1.000 0.000 0.000
Link to WH/Bank 0.000 0.000 0.000
SSH Service 0.000 0.000 0.000
External network
connection 1.000 0.000 0.000
Filesystem 1.000 0.000 0.000
Root privilege
shell created 0.500 Apache Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
MySQL Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
Link to WH/Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000
SSH Service 1.000 1.000 1.000
External network
connection 1.000 1.000 1.000
Filesystem 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 4.15 Framework input intrusions adapted from ADEPTS example.
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Run Rank Response Rank Response
1
1 Kill crontab process 1 Block web ports
2 Deny access to / kill crontab 2 Kill Apache privilege shell
3 Block attacker’s source IP 3 Block attacker’s source IP
4 Kill Apache privilege shell 4 Kill crontab process
5 Block web ports 5 Restart Apache
6 Restart Apache 6 Reboot Apache’s host machine
7 — 7 Deny access to / kill crontab
8 — 8 Set Apache docroot to read-only
3
1 Kill crontab process 1 Block web ports
2 Deny access to / kill crontab 2 Deny access to crontab command
3 Block attacker’s source IP 3 Reboot Apache’s host machine
4 Kill Apache privilege shell 4 Kill crontab process
5 Block web ports 5 Block attacker’s source IP
6
1 Kill crontab process 1 Reboot Apache’s host machine
2 Deny access to / kill crontab 2 Deny access to / kill crontab
Table 4.16 A comparison of the responses deployed by ADEPTS and those
deployed by our framework.
tors to tolerate several iterations of excessively similar intrusions. Typically after the intrusion
is detected and responded to, additional preventative measures are implemented to enhance
resistance to that specific intrusion (and often that general intrusion type). This leads to the
conclusion that optimal cost savings in intrusion response is more significant as the learning
time to choose the most optimal response is reduced.
4.2.4 Comparison to expert intuition
To determine how well this framework models system administrator intuition, selected
administrators were asked to use the Java implementation and respond with how well the
results matched the responses they would have chosen.
While the number of responses was not sufficient to provide representative quantitative re-
sults, the responses show a wide variance both from the responses chosen by our framework and
from each other. This indicates that even among experts with significant system administra-
tion experience, the intuition is not universal when choosing the response to deploy, reinforcing
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the need for a concrete response cost metric from a practical as well as theoretical standpoint.
As one responder says: “I would have gone big, blocking the subnet, initially which may be an
over-reaction. The equation results characterize a smooth process for system administrators to
follow during an attack,” indicating that having a metric such as that presented in this work
would result in a lower tendency for human error in the face of an intrusion.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we have presented a host-based framework for the cost-sensitive assessment
and selection of an intrusion response. This framework incorporates a set of evaluation metrics
for the practical assessment of costs and benefits associated with intrusions and responses, and
introduces a balanced strategy for response selection according to the security policy of the
specified system.
We have shown, through the implementation and analysis of this framework, that while
the field of automated intrusion response is still in its infancy and significant research effort
is required to address all of the weaknesses still present in such systems, sufficient under-
standing exists in this field to construct a system which, with minimal interaction by system
administrators, can significantly reduce the cost of intrusion response. This thesis constructs
an automated response framework which selects responses based on a cost assessment model
characterized by:
1. Separation of the security policy from the cost model.
2. Definitions of intrusion and response cost measures.
3. Development of a system aware adaptable model.
4. An implementable framework.
By leveraging human expertise in conjunction with structured specification guidance during
the system resource, response, and intrusion specification phase, a robust automated response
system can be used to reduce human error and respond to intrusions accurately in a fraction
of the time required for manual response.
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In addition, the performance analysis indicates that automated responses systems using
this cost metric can be deployed which responds quickly enough to thwart active attacks in
real time using optimal responses.
5.2 Future Work
As noted above, automated intrusion response is still a relatively young field in the computer
security research arena. During the course of this research work, the following areas emerged
as particularly promising avenues for future exploration:
Automating the impact evaluation of intrusions and responses on system re-
sources. One of the primary challenges in the broad deployment of automated response
systems remains the degree of effort and overhead required to implement the system. While
system administrator input is a core component to intrusion response cost assessment, au-
tomating the enumeration of system resources would be a dramatic reduction in the manual
labor required. In addition, enabling automatic assessment of response and intrusion impact
would allow the extension of this model to include previously unseen intrusions, and dynamic
composition of more sophisticated responses. One concrete direction might be to automate
the inclusion of Snort rules, and combining these with a dynamic assessment of impact based
on signature descriptions or common vulnerability assessments (i.e. CVSS, CVE).
Expanding the response to include sets of responses which minimize cost and
maximize expected benefit. Response composition (combining multiple atomic responses
to deploy a more sophisticated set of response actions) is a direction which would allow not
only a response to more sophisticated attacks, but would also open avenues of combining
attack containment and intrusion recovery. This is a key requirement in the evolution toward
self-healing systems.
Extending this framework to a distributed environment. While the work pre-
sented in this thesis emphasizes host-based application, the general principles are extensible to
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distributed systems as well. This would allow a resource hierarchy to be used, and network-
optimal responses to be selected.
Developing metrics for the integrity and confidentiality of a system. While a
number of established metrics for availability exist (mean-time between failure, responsiveness,
etc.), concretely measuring integrity or confidentiality have received less treatment. Investigat-
ing these areas would allow the incorporation of more sophisticated cost measurements, and
are a key component of automatically determining the impact of intrusions and responses.
Defining in concrete terms the measure of success and failure for response
actions. Permitting the response system to dynamically adjust selected responses based
on past behavior requires enabling the system to correctly incorporating success and failure
to specific response actions. Determining generic and scalable mechanisms for ascertaining
response success, failure, and correctly ascribing these to response actions is another area where
progress is needed. One approach worth pursuing is a federated model of information sharing
to allow organizations to contributed past experiences with responses in specific intrusion
contexts.
Explore the use of hierarchical categories for intrusions / responses. The use
of a hierarchical assessment of intrusions and responses is also a noteworthy research direc-
tion. Automating the classification of intrusions or responses, and incorporating this hierarchy
into the cost assessment framework would enable the cost measurement of previously unseen
intrusions, and also support reducing the overhead involved in deploying this framework.
Implementation expansion. In addition to the research directions mentioned above,
planned implementation expansion includes the deployment of a network-based cost-sensitive
response framework at the Department of Energy’s Ames Laboratory at Iowa State University,
and discussions with the broader DOE community about deploying the framework in support
of a federated intrusion response architecture. Both of these efforts will require considerable
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additional testing and enhancements to the current design and implementation of our intrusion
detection and response system.
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